ROSALIND HOBBS

Rosalind Hobbs

The University of Tulsa

Ancient Political Thought

November 13, 2020

 

Aristotle’s Politics on The Types of Constitutions:

A Story of Inherent Fragility or Admirable Perseverance?

 

              In Aristotle’s Politics, while all forms of constitutions are inherently defective, it is the duty of the state, in order to avoid it becoming worse, to be aware of which measures will preserve or destroy it. Whether it be a small or large constitution, or just or unjust, each regime possesses unique fragilities that must be nurtured in order to maintain constitutional stability. Yet above all, the education of a state’s citizens plays a vital role in this preservation.

 

              A state’s constitution is defined by the size as well as whether or not it is just. Firstly, constitutions take shape in one of three sizes: ruled by a single person, a small, elite group, or the masses. Within these three sizes exist both just and unjust regimes. The just, or the “right,” constitutions reflect “authority exercised in the common interest” while unjust, or “wrong,” or “perverted,” is “directed to the selfish interest of the ruling body” (III.6, 1278b).

Six regimes exist within these boundaries of categorization.

 

              A just constitution ruled by one person is a kingship, while the unjust is a tyranny. While both ruled by one, a kingship is of nobility while a tyranny is oppressive. As applied to the previous definition of just versus unjust constitutions, a kingship aims to benefit the city while a tyranny promotes only the goals of the ruling leader.

 

              Within constitutions of small, elite ruling bodies the just is defined as an aristocracy whereas the unjust is an oligarchy. An aristocracy is the ruling of the best and relies much on merit; an oligarchy is the ruling of the wealthy. Neither are created with the intent of a limited quantity, however, the standards of both, whether it be family titles or wealth, inherently create the small circle that characterizes both regimes. Thus, the size of both is simply the result of their prerequisites to hold positions in office.

 

              Finally, a politeia, or a constitutional government, is the just constitution of the masses, where the people is sovereign, while a democracy is the unjust counterpart. A democracy can be defined by two features: (1) the sovereignty of the majority and (2) the liberty of individuals. While democracy is the ruling of the freeborn, it is unjust in that it acts in the interest of the needy rather than the state as a whole.

 

              It is important here to note that a politeia is a combination of democracy and oligarchy. However, a politeia can still exist in various forms depending on the expression of democracy and oligarchy. A politeia can represent a genuine combination of the two regimes or it can be formed by only the favorable or selected elements of each.

 

              Each of the six regimes contain unique weaknesses making them fragile to destruction and/or a constitutional change, however, Aristotle offers advice to preserve these constitutions. Generally, all constitutions are threatened when any of the following occurs: (1) the ruling body upsets the people, (2) opportunity for rebellion is given, (3) the ruling body is too powerful, (4) a societal class grows disproportionately large, and (5) disloyalties exist high in the ranks of power.

 

              While most of which occurs naturally in any constitution, there are important methods in which to preserve constitutional stability. Simply put, a constitution is most likely to last if those in power are loyal, highly competent, and of good character, however, it is also much more complex than that. To avoid anger directed towards the ruling body, those holding office must, to the best of their ability, treat the public with fairness and decency which includes never attempting to deceive the people. To eliminate opportunity for revolt, one recommended strategy is to create a state of emergency to distract and reunite. When a class becomes disproportionately large, it is important to (1) be aware of when this happens, and (2) give rebalancing power to the opposite class. Finally, as much as one can, prevent factions amongst the ranks of power and prevent public office from becoming a source of profit.

 

              In addition to these weaknesses and their suggested remedies, within each regime exists particular fragilities. The stability of a tyranny is threatened when the ruler is either too merciful or too blatantly arrogant. To avoid the former, it is necessary that a tyrant must enforce an unrelentingly harsh policy of repression. Like extreme democracy, the objectives of this approach would be to “break the spirit of subjects, to sow distrust among them, and to make them incapable of action” (V.11 1313a). While not necessarily just by any means, this approach of instituting immobilizing fear is effective.

 

              However, a wise tyrant can also make the tyranny tolerable by doing everything in the ruler’s power to keep the people happy. This would involve keeping in check the personal desires of the tyrant, which treads on becoming simply a kingship. Subsequently, the leader of a kingship must avoid angering the public, thus, this constitution will thrive under a policy of moderation.

 

              An oligarchy will face threats from both within and without. On the exterior, revolts amongst the poor can give way. This, however, only occurs if the poor believe they are as equally powerful as the rich. Additionally, an oligarchy will face problems if the general wealth rises. To remedy this, it is necessary to maintain a proportionate property requirement and adjust it as needed. This involves keeping a close watch on the public. On the interior, the ruling circle is susceptible to developing even smaller and more elite factions. A useful solution to this, in both democracies and oligarchies, is to limit the tenure of those holding office. In an oligarchy specifically, it can be useful to also offer special attention to the poor; this is the opposite in a democracy.

 

              The death of democracy, the doorway to tyranny, is the rise of demagoguery. The demagogue can take two approaches to deconstructing a democracy. They can attack the rich individually with falsehoods to encourage the joining of forces, or the demagogue can attack the class as a whole to rally others against them. However, with the evolution of rhetoric, many demagogues, increasingly fewer from military backgrounds, do not take a tyrannical route.

A democracy always faces another threat when classes become too powerful in contrast to others, especially between the rich and the poor. This is true with a politeia as well. Thus, it is vital that a large middle class be maintained to keep afloat both types of regimes. The middle class serves the role as the mean of these constitutions.

 

              In a city of only rich and poor classes, the rich will have contempt for the poor and the poor will have hatred and envy for the rich. A strong middle class decreases the opportunities for factionalism. While difficult to create in small states, a large middle class is quite practical in larger states and is an ideal strategy to remedy the differences between the rich and the poor.

 

             The middle class, not blinded by the suffering of poverty nor motivated solely by wealth, can bring about a fair perspective that considers all classes’ needs. Those who possess in moderation are the “most ready to listen to reason” (IV.11.1295b34). Offering both compassion for the poor and enough hope to someday be a part of the rich, a strong middle class will make educated decisions that will be the most practical for the state. Without this mediator, democracy cannot function for the poor would overwhelm the rich in an attempt to take their money, potentially under the influence of a demagogue, or the state will transition into an oligarchy to sustain the power of the wealthy.

 

          However, above creating states of emergency or strategically rebalancing the classes, nothing can better secure a constitution, of any sorts, than through mere education:

 

              “The greatest, however, of all the means we have mentioned for ensuring the stability of constitutions, but one which is nowadays generally neglected, is the

               education of citizens in the spirit of their constitutions” (V.9.1310a12).

 

An attempt at preservation is entirely useless if the population of the state is deprived of what it means to be a citizen, and a good citizen at that. Additionally, a general understanding of the nature of a state’s constitution amongst both citizens and leaders is necessary in allowing it to thrive.

 

              Between kingships and tyrannies, aristocracies and oligarchies, and constitutional governments and democracies, there is no perfect model of constitution, whether it be small or large, just or unjust. However, there does exist, not the best constitutions, but the most practical constitutions for each kind of state. They are all accompanied with their own ideal approach to constitutional stability. Once any of these regimes are adopted, they do not function seamlessly; it would be foolish to believe so. To know the weaknesses of a constitution is to know how to preserve it, and it is the duty of the ruling body to keep a continuous and cautionary eye on the mechanics of their constitution to be prepared to remedy the cracks in the machine.

 

Works Cited

Aristotle, Ernest Barker, and R. F. Stalley. Politics. Oxford University Press Inc., 2009.